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Abstract—In this paper, we pioneer the study of physical-layer
security in heterogeneous networks (HetNets). We investigate
secure communications in a two-tier downlink HetNet, which
comprises one macrocell and several femtocells. Each cell has
multiple users and an eavesdropper attempts to wiretap the
intended macrocell user. Firstly, we consider an orthogonal
spectrum allocation strategy to eliminate co-channel interference,
and propose the secrecy transmit beamforming only operating
in the macrocell (STB-OM) as a partial solution for secure
communication in HetNet. Next, we consider a secrecy-oriented
non-orthogonal spectrum allocation strategy and propose two
cooperative STBs which rely on the collaboration amongst the
macrocell base station (MBS) and the adjacent femtocell base
stations (FBSs). Our first cooperative STB is the STB sequentially
operating in the macrocell and femtocells (STB-SMF), where the
cooperative FBSs individually design their STB matrices and
then feed their performance metrics to the MBS for guiding the
STB in the macrocell. Aiming to improve the performance of
STB-SMF, we further propose the STB jointly designed in the
macrocell and femtocells (STB-JMF), where all cooperative FBSs
feed channel state information to the MBS for designing the joint
STB. Unlike conventional STBs conceived for broadcasting or
interference channels, the three proposed STB schemes all entail
relatively sophisticated optimizations due to QoS constraints
of the legitimate users. In order to efficiently use these STB
schemes, the original optimization problems are reformulated
and convex optimization techniques, such as second-order cone
programming and semidefinite programming, are invoked to
obtain the optimal solutions. Numerical results demonstrate that
the proposed STB schemes are highly effective in improving the
secrecy rate performance of HetNet.
Index Terms—Beamforming, femtocell, nonconvex optimiza-
tion, heterogeneous network, physical-layer security, semidefinite
programming (SDP).
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid proliferation of smart phones, tablets
and machine-to-machine communications, there is an ever-
increasing demand for seamless wireless coverage, extremely
high mobile data rate and reliable secrecy performance [1].
Aiming to effectively enhance the spectral and/or energy
efficiency of wireless networks, it has been suggested that the
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deployment density of various network-nodes should increase
[2], [3], and smart access-point activation and resource man-
agement are essential to utilize the dense network-nodes [4].
Therefore, heterogeneous network (HetNet) [5], [6] has been
attracting great research interests, and it is regarded as one of
the most promising techniques for providing higher network
capacity and wider coverage. HetNet is supported by various
types of base stations with different transmit power budgets.
Macrocell base stations (MBSs) provide public access and
wide area coverage up to a few kilometers to all the marcocell
users (MUs). Small cell base stations, such as femtocell base
stations (FBSs), are typically overlaid on the existing macro-
cells and installed in the building or indoor environment close
to femtocell users (FUs). It is noted that the network archi-
tecture of HetNet becomes more open and diverse compared
to the conventional single-tier cellular networks, which makes
the information exchange more susceptible to eavesdropping.
Recently, physical-layer security (PLS) has been proposed as a
family of viable techniques to secure wireless communications
[7], [8], and it also has the potential to tackle the security
problem encountered in HetNet.
Traditionally, the security problem in wireless networks
was mainly studied at higher layers using key-based cryp-
tographic methods [9]. This conventional wisdom relies on
the assumption that the eavesdropper is not computationally
powerful to break the secret key. However, as the computa-
tional capability of wireless devices develops rapidly, perfect
security can be hardly guaranteed with the key-based solutions.
It is reasonable to argue that security measures should be
invoked at all layers where they can be implemented in a
cost-effective manner. Notably, the physical layer has remained
almost ignored for security in the past. The basic idea of PLS
is to exploit the randomness of wireless channel for secure
message transmission [10]. The authors in [8], [11], [12]
investigated the PLS in single-antenna fading channels. Since
then, the secure communication in multi-antenna channels has
been extensively studied [13]–[19] and in particular, practi-
cal and robust multi-antenna secrecy beamforming schemes
were investigated in [19] very recently. Secure broadcasting
with more than two receivers were considered in [20]–[22].
Other related works in the contexts of the multiple-access
channel with confidential messages [23], the multiple-access
channel wiretap channel [24], and the cognitive multiple-
access channel with confidential messages [25] have also been
reported. Recently, there are growing research interests in the
secrecy communication over interference channels, where the
interference may be potentially exploited for improving the
secrecy performance. More specifically, in [26], the authors
2studied the inner and outer bounds for the secrecy capacity
regions of a two-user interference network where the receivers
are potentially eavesdroppers. The secrecy rate of a two-
user interference network with an outer eavesdropper was
investigated in [27]. The MIMO Gaussian interference channel
with confidential messages was studied in [28] using game-
theoretic approach. The authors of [29] addressed the problem
of minimizing the transmit power with imperfect channel state
information (CSI) in a K-user multiple-input single-output
interference network, and the so-called "S-procedure" was
applied. It should be noted that the existing works on PLS
mainly focus on traditional network architectures, and the
research on PLS for HetNet is still largely missing.
Because of the densely overlaid network architecture, there
is ubiquitous interference of various types existing in HetNet
[30]. From the viewpoint of PLS, deliberately introducing
interference can be beneficial for the secrecy rate performance
of the system [10]. Inspired by this insight, the interference
should be utilized, rather than avoided, to improve the secrecy
rate in HetNet using techniques such as proper spectrum
allocation and cooperative beamforming. To elaborate a little
further, motivated by the inter-cell interference coordination
techniques [31]–[35], spectrum allocation can be rearranged
dynamically in conjunction with various levels of cooperation
between the network nodes, such as the MBS and FBSs,
to generate the desired co-channel interference (CCI) to the
eavesdropper. As a result, judicious cooperative beamforming
schemes may be designed to cope with CCI for the sake of
improving the secrecy rate performance in HetNet.
In this paper, a two-tier downlink HetNet system is consid-
ered, where MBS and FBSs serve the corresponding legitimate
MUs and FUs, and a MU acts maliciously as an eavesdropper
to wiretap another legitimate MU. For the considered sce-
nario, we propose three secrecy transmit beamforming (STB)
schemes in conjunction with two spectrum allocation schemes
for secure communications in the HetNet, assuming different
degrees of cooperation among the network nodes. As an initial
study, we first consider the conventional orthogonal spectrum
allocation (OSA) strategy [36], where orthogonal spectrum
resources are allocated to the MBS and the adjacent FBSs
to eliminate the cross-tier interference and the interference
among adjacent femtocells. Employing OSA, the considered
scenario can be simplified as the secure communication in
a broadcasting channel, and we consider the STB only per-
formed in macrocell (STB-OM) as a partial solution for the se-
cure communication in HetNet. It is noted that STB-OM aims
to maximize the secrecy rate of the intended MU subject to
the Quality of Service (QoS) constraints of the other legitimate
MUs; no cooperation between the MBS and FBSs is necessary.
Inspired by the fact that friendly interference can help secure
communication [10], we deliberately introduce interference in
the HetNet with the secrecy-oriented non-orthogonal spectrum
allocation (SONOSA) strategy, which dynamically changes the
local pattern of the underlay OSA. Specifically, some cooper-
ative FBSs adjacent to the eavesdropper are assigned with the
same frequency resource as MBS, while the OSA strategy still
applies to the non-cooperative FBSs. Consequently, CCI is de-
liberately introduced around the eavesdropper to enable more
effective cooperative STB. Specifically, two STB schemes are
proposed in conjunction with SONOSA, where MBS performs
STB in collaboration with its cooperative co-channel FBSs.
Firstly, a STB scheme is proposed to improve STB-OM with
a little cross-tier cooperation, which is sequentially performed
in macrocell and femtocells (STB-SMF). In this scheme, each
cooperative FBS designs its STB to altruistically maximize
the generated interference to the eavesdropper while serving its
own FUs. Then each cooperative FBS calculates a performance
metric and feeds it back to the MBS to facilitate the STB in
macrocell, and the MBS can still use the STB-OM with minor
modification. In order to improve the overall performance of
STB-SMF, another STB is proposed with the limited cross-
tier cooperation, which is jointly performed in macrocell and
femtocells (STB-JMF). In this scheme, each cooperative FBS
feeds its CSI back to the MBS for the joint STB, which aims to
guarantee the QoS requirements of both MUs and FUs while
enhancing the secrecy rate of the intended MU.
For the sake of clarity, the main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows:
1) Upon adopting the OSA strategy, an STB-OM scheme is
proposed to secure the broadcast channel of the macro-
cell, where the confidential message and the common
messages are simultaneously transmitted. In particular,
an iterative algorithm is proposed to maximize the se-
crecy rate while satisfying the QoS of the common mes-
sages. In order to handle the complicated optimization
problem, we transform the original nonconvex problem
into a second-order cone program (SOCP) with the aid
of a first-order Taylor approximation. The approxima-
tion can be improved with each iteration. Therefore, a
local optimum of the original optimization problem can
be obtained in several iterations. It is noted that the
proposed STB-OM is different from the conventional
STB schemes in the broadcasting channel [37], [38],
where only the confidential message transmission is
considered. Furthermore, the STB-OM is applicable to
the general single cell scenarios and does not need
cooperation between the MBS and FBSs, which also
initiates our cooperative STB exploiting CCI.
2) Based on the SONOSA strategy, a STB-SMF scheme
is proposed to improve the secrecy rate of STB-OM
while guaranteeing the QoS requirements of legitimate
MUs. Different from the traditional jamming sources
[39], the cooperative FBSs still serve their FUs while
helping the MBS. In order to enhance the secrecy rate
performance of the intended MU, the cooperative FBSs
selflessly increase the interference power towards the
eavesdropper without considering the QoS of their FUs,
and the optimization problem is efficiently solved by
SOCP. It is worth pointing out that each cooperative FBS
designs its STB with local CSI, and only a scalar is fed
back to the MBS for its STB in macrocell, where the
MBS can still adopt STB-OM. Therefore, the STB-SMF
scheme imposes very little overhead for the cross-tier
cooperation, and is compatible with STB-OM.
3) Employing SONOSA strategy, an STB-JMF scheme is
3proposed to strike a better balance between the secret-
rate performance of the intended MUs and the QoS
requirements of the legitimate MUs and FUs. It is
noted that such complicated optimization is nonconvex,
and we opt for reformulating it into a tractable two-
stage problem. Specifically, we first fix the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the eavesdropper
to formulate the inner stage problem, which can be
further transformed into a tractable semidefinite program
(SDP) by applying the semidefinite relaxation technique.
Then, we perform a one-dimensional search to solve the
outer stage problem, which finds the most suitable SINR
of the eavesdropper to optimize the original objective. It
is noted that the MBS only needs to collect the CSI from
its cooperative FBSs for this joint STB, and such cross-
tier cooperation imposes acceptable overhead for the
backhaul. Furthermore, unlike the altruistic STB of the
cooperative FBSs in STB-SMF, the STB-JMF shceme
guarantees the QoS of the FUs in the cooperative FBSs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the downlink HetNet system model and the corresponding
spectrum allocation strategies are presented, and we derive
SINR expressions of various network nodes for the following
beamforming design. Based on the two spectrum allocation
strategies, three STB schemes are proposed in Section III,
where the related optimization problems are formulated and
solved. In Section IV, simulation results show the effectiveness
of the proposed algorithms. Finally, conclusions and future
directions are provided in Section V.
Notations: Bold upper and lower case letters denote
matrices and vectors, respectively. Transpose and conjugate
transpose are denoted by (·)T and (·)H , respectively, while
E {·} represents expectation. Tr (·) is the trace operator, ‖ · ‖
represents the Euclidean norm, | · | denotes the mode of a
complex number, and rank (·) stands for the rank of a matrix.
X  0 indicates that X is Hermitian positive semidefinite.
C represents the field of complex numbers. Re (·) and Im (·)
denote the real part and the imaginary part of a complex num-
ber, respectively. Additionally, the integer set {1, 2, . . . ,K} is
abbreviated as [1,K]. CN (µ, σ2) denotes a complex Gaussian
variable with mean µ and variance σ2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a downlink HetNet as shown in Fig. 1. There
is one NM -antenna MBS at the center, and M single-antenna
MUs are randomly distributed throughout the macrocell cover-
age area, where we have NM > M , while the single-antenna
eavesdropper intends to wiretap the confidential message trans-
mitted to a legitimate MU. Additionally, F NF -antenna FBSs
are spatially distributed according to a homogeneous Poisson
point process and each FBS aims to serve K single-antenna
FUs, where we have NF > K . To simplify the analysis, we
assume that the transmit power of each FBS is fixed and equal,
denoted by PF . Similar to that of the FBSs, the transmit power
of the MBS is assumed to be PM . Other relevant variables are
defined in Table 1.
Two spectrum allocation strategies are developed in this pa-
per, i.e., the OSA strategy and the SONOSA strategy. Serving
FBS FBS
EavesdropperMBS 
FBS
FBS
FBS
Fig. 1. Downlink HetNet system model, comprising a macrocell and N
femtocells. The macrocell consists of a MBS, M legitimate MUs and an
eavesdropper. Each FBS serves K FUs.
Table 1
LIST OF THE MAJOR VARIABLES
Variable Definition
MUm, FBSn
FUnk
the m-th MU, the n-th cooperative FBS of
MBS and the k-th FU of the n-th cooperative
FBS
sm the message signal intended for the MUm,
m ∈ [1,M ] , satisfying E{‖sm‖} = 1
snk the message signal intended for FUnk ,
n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1, K], satisfying
E{‖snk‖} = 1
hm the channel vector from the MBS to MUm
hn,m the channel vector from FBSn to MUm
hE the channel vector from the MBS to the
eavesdropper
hn,E the channel vector from FBSn to the
eavesdropper
hnk the channel vector from the MBS to FUnk
hp,nk the channel vector from FBSp to FUnk ,
p ∈ [1, N ]
wm the precoding vector for MUm
wnk the precoding vector for FUnk
as the underlay spectrum allocation strategy, OSA allocates
orthogonal spectrum resources to the MBS and the adjacent
FBSs to eliminate the cross-tier interference as well as the
interference among adjacent femtocells [36]. Building upon
OSA, SONOSA dynamically changes the local pattern of OSA
to enable advanced cooperative STB schemes. Specifically,
the SONOSA strategy assigns the same frequency resource
occupied by the MBS to the FBSs which are adjacent to the
eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 2. Employing SONOSA, the
co-channel FBSs can work in collaboration with the MBS to
generate interference to the eavesdropper while serving their
own FUs.
Considering SONOSA, we assume that there are N (1 ≤
N < F ) cooperative FBSs employing CCI to improve the
secrecy rate of the eavesdropped MU. Let us denote the n-th
cooperative FBS of the MBS as FBSn and the m-th MU as
4Fig. 2. An example for OSA and SONOSA, where the polygons with the
same color denote the femtocells with the same frequency resource, the apple-
green triangle is MBS, the cell phone is the eavesdropped MU and the ear
denotes the eavesdropper. It is noted that OSA is the underlay strategy, and
SONOSA dynamically changes the local pattern of OSA. Three apple-green
femtocells are assigned with the same frequency resource as the macrocell to
generate CCI against the eavesdropper.
MUm, then the received signal at MUm is given by
ym =hmwmsm +
M∑
q=1,q 6=m
hmwqsq
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
hn,mwnksnk + nm, m ∈ [1,M ] ,
(1)
where hm ∈ C1×NM and hn,m ∈ C1×NF denote the
channel vector from the MBS to MUm and the channel vector
from the FBSn to MUm, respectively.1 wm ∈ CNM×1 and
sm represent the precoding vector and the message symbol
intended for MUm, respectively. Similarly, wnk ∈ CNF×1
and snk are the precoding vector and the message signal
intended for the k-th FU of the n-th cooperative FBS, denoted
as FUnk. nm is the Gaussian noise following independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) CN (0, σ2M) at MUm. The
precoding vectors for the MUs satisfy the power constraint of∑M
m=1 ‖wm‖2 = PM and the precoding vectors for the FUs in
a femtocell satisfy the power constraint of
∑K
k=1 ‖wnk‖2 =
PF . Without loss of generality, we assume that there is an
eavesdropper wiretapping MU12, therefore the received signal
1In this paper, we just assume perfect CSI as our first step to get
fundamental insights into the physical layer security problem in HetNet. We
will consider a more practical model including imperfect CSI in our future
work.
2Similar to [40], we focus on the beamforming design in this paper. The
identification problem – how to identify which MU has been intercepted by
the eavesdropper – is challenging and important, which will be investigated
in detail in our future work. In principle, this problem can be solved by
authentication: the MBS may broadcast some test messages to each MU in
a round-robin manner, and ask each of them to feed back what has been
listened. For the wiretapped MU, the MBS will receive feedback from two
sources.
at the eavesdropper is given by
yE =hEw1s1 +
M∑
m=2
hEwmsm
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
hn,Ewnksnk + nE ,
(2)
where hE ∈ C1×NM denotes the channel vector from the MBS
to the eavesdropper, hn,E ∈ C1×NF is the channel vector
from FBSn to the eavesdropper, and nE is the Gaussian noise
obeying i.i.d. CN (0, σ2E) at the eavesdropper. Furthermore,
the received signal at FUnk can be formulated as
ynk = hn,nkwnksnk +
K∑
t=1,t6=k
hn,nkwntsnt
+
N∑
p=1,p6=n
K∑
t=1
hp,nkwptspt +
M∑
m=1
hnkwmsm + nnk,
(3)
where hn,nk ∈ C1×NF is the channel vector from FBSn to
FUnk, hnk ∈ C1×NM is the channel vector form MBSn
to FUk, and the Gaussian noise nnk at FUnk follows i.i.d.
CN (0, σ2F ).
To facilitate the analysis of secrecy rate performance, we
define the SINR of MUm as
SINRm =
|hmwm| 2
Am
,m ∈ [1,M ] , (4)
where
Am =
M∑
q=1,q 6=m
|hmwq|2 +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
|hn,mwnk|2 + σ2M .
Similarly, the SINR of the eavesdropper is represented as
SINRE =
|hEw1|2
BE
, (5)
where
BE =
M∑
m=2
|hEwm|2 +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
|hn,Ewnk|2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
IFTsum
+σ2E ,
and IFTsum is the sum of the additional interference tem-
perature from all the cooperative FBSs to the eavesdropper.
Finally, the SINR of the FUnk is written as
SINRnk =
|hn,nkwnk|2
Cnk
, n ∈ [1, N ] , k ∈ [1,K] , (6)
where
Cnk =
K∑
t=1,t6=k
|hn,nkwnt|2 +
N∑
p=1,p6=n
K∑
t=1
|hp,nkwpt|2
+
M∑
m=1
|hnkwm|2 + σ2F .
After the above preliminary derivations, we will propose
three STB schemes in the next section to maximize the secrecy
rate of the intended MU1.
5MBS
Eavesdropped MU
Eavesdropper
Legitimate MU
Fig. 3. An example channel model for the STB-OM scheme, consisting of
one MBS, M = 2 MUs and one eavesdropper wiretaps the first MU. As the
OSA is employed, the system is equivalent to a broadcast system. The solid
lines indicate useful data streams, and the dash line indicates the interference
stream.
III. SECURITY TRANSMIT BEAMFORMING SCHEMES FOR
HETNET
In this section, we propose three secrecy communication
schemes to improve the secrecy rate of HetNet by jointly
considering the spectrum allocation strategy and the transmit
beamforming. Firstly, based on the OSA strategy, we propose
the STB-OM scheme as a partial solution for secure commu-
nication in HetNet. Then, we employ the SONOSA strategy to
propose the STB-SMF scheme, which improves STB-OM with
secrecy-oriented CCI generated by the altruistic cooperative
FBSs. At last, aiming at a balanced system performance, we
propose the STB-JMF scheme, which optimizes the security-
rate of the intended MU while satisfying the QoS constraints
of both legitimate MUs and FUs. In the remaining part of
this section, we will discuss each STB scheme in detail. Note
that in all the three proposed schemes, we assume that the
local CSI of the MUs and of the eavesdropper is available
at the MBS3, and each FBS knows the local CSI of its own
femtocell.
A. Secrecy Transmit Beamforming Only Performed in Macro-
cell (STB-OM)
Let us first discuss the STB-OM scheme that relies on
the OSA strategy. Because different frequency resources are
allocated to the MBS and FBSs, no CCI exists in this scheme.
As shown in Fig. 3, the MBS serves multiple legitimate MUs,
and we assume that MU1 is wiretapped by the eavesdropper.
Our goal is to maximize the secrecy rate of MU1 while
guaranteeing the QoS, i.e., SINR, requirements of other le-
gitimate MUs. The proposed STB-OM scheme is aiming at
the secrecy rate maximization. Unfortunately, this optimization
problem, formulated as (7a) to (7c), is non-convex and hence
prohibitive computational complexity may be incurred for
finding its optimum solution. As a compromise, we employ a
low-complexity iterative algorithm [41] which conservatively
approximates the original problem as several tractable SOCP
subproblems. In the remaining part of this subsection, the
details of the problem formulation and solution are provided.
3Similar to [14], [15], [19], and [37], we assume that the CSI of the
eavesdropper is also available at the MBS in order to make the STB more
tractable.
Initially, the secrecy rate optimization problem of STB-OM
can be formulated as
max
{wm}Mm=1
log(1 + SINR1)− log(1 + SINRE) (7a)
s.t. SINRm ≥ γm,m ∈ [2,M ] , (7b)∑M
m=1 ‖wm‖2 ≤ PM , (7c)
where the received SINRs from (4) and (5), that are associated
with MUm and the eavesdropper, can be simplified as
SINRm =
|hmwm|2
σ2M +
∑M
q=1,q 6=m |hmwq|2
, (8)
and
SINRE =
|hEw1|2
σ2E +
∑M
m=2 |hEwm|2 + IFTsum
, (9)
respectively, when the OSA strategy is adopted. Note that
the IFTsum in this STB-OM is zero, because OSA does not
introduce CCI. The constraint (7b) is the QoS requirements
of the other legitimate MUs, i.e., MUm,m ∈ [2,M ], and (7c)
represents the total transmit power constraint at the MBS. To
make the above problem more tractable, we introduce a pair
of slack variables t1 and t2. Then, the original problem can
be equivalently reformulated as
max
{wm}Mm=1,t1,t2
log(t1) + log(t2) (10a)
s.t. 1 + SINR1 ≥ t1, (10b)
1 + SINRE ≤ 1/t2, (10c)
SINRm ≥ γm,m ∈ [2,M ] , (10d)
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 ≤ PM . (10e)
Without loss of generality, in the following, we assume σ2M =
σ2E = σ
2
F = σ
2 = 1. Substituting (8) and (9) into the above
problem, (10) can be transformed as follows
max
{wm}Mm=1,t1,t2
t1t2 (11a)
s.t. 1 +
M∑
m=2
w
H
mH1wm ≤
w
H
1 H1w1
t1 − 1 , (11b)
1 +
M∑
m=1
w
H
mHEwm
≤ 1 +
∑M
m=2w
H
mHEwm
t2
, (11c)
γm

1 + M∑
q=1,q 6=m
w
H
q Hmwq


≤ wHmHmwm,m ∈ [2,M ] , (11d)
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 ≤ PM , (11e)
where we introduce the matrices H1 = h1hH1 , Hm = hmhHm,
HE = hEh
H
E . It is noted the logarithm function is removed
because of its monotonically increasing property. As we can
6see, the right-hand side of the constraints (11b) and (11c)
are both quadratic-over-linear functions which are convex
[42]. However, both constraints remain non-convex because
they are expressed as the form of f1(x) ≤ f2(x), namely
f1(x) − f2(x) ≤ 0, where f1(x) and f2(x) are both convex
functions. More specifically, it is well known that the sum of
convex functions is convex. Then, f1(x)−f2(x) is non-convex.
Following the idea of the constrained convex procedure [41],
we replace these quadratic-over-linear functions with their
corresponding first-order expansions, and then the problem can
be transformed into a convex one. Specifically, we define
FA,a(w, x) =
w
H
Aw
x− a , (12)
where x ≥ a,A  0. The first-order Taylor expansion of (12)
at a certain point (w˜, x˜) is given by
QA,a(w, x, w˜, x˜) =
2Re{w˜HAw}
x˜− a −
w˜
H
Aw˜
(x˜− a)2 (x−a). (13)
Furthermore, it is noted that max t1t2 can transformed into
a SOCP representation, e.g., max t0 with an additional con-
straint ‖[2t0 (t1 − t2)]‖ ≤ t1 + t2. This transformation is
based on the fact that the constraint t1t2 ≥ t20 is equivalent
to ‖[2t0 (t1 − t2)]‖ ≤ t1 + t2, where we have t1 ≥ 0 and
t2 ≥ 0. Based on the above preparations, for the point (w˜, x˜),
the problem (11) can then be transformed into a convex
optimization problem as follows
max
{wm}Mm=1,t0,t1,t2
t0 (14a)
s.t. 1 +
M∑
m=2
w
H
mH1wm
≤ QH1,1(w1, t1, w˜1, t˜1), (14b)
1 +
M∑
m=1
w
H
mHEwm
≤ 2
t˜2
− t2
t˜22
+
M∑
m=2
QHE ,0(wm, t2, w˜m, t˜2),
(14c)
γm

1 + M∑
q=1,q 6=m
w
H
q Hmwq


≤ wHmHmwm,m ∈ [2,M ] , (14d)
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 ≤ PM , (14e)
‖[2t0 (t1 − t2)]‖ ≤ t1 + t2. (14f)
Eventually, the problem can be converted to the following
SOCP form (15) where the linear functions g1, g2, g3m are
respectively defined as
g1 = QH1,1(w1, t1, w˜1, t˜1)− 1, (16)
g2 =
M∑
m=2
QHE ,0(wm, t2, w˜m, t˜2)− t2/t˜22 − 1, (17)
g3m = Re
(
w
H
mhm
)
/
√
γm,m ∈ [2,M ] . (18)
It is noted the SOCP (15) can be solved efficiently by using
the available solvers such as CVX [43]. The proposed STB-OM
scheme is summarized by Algorithm 1 as follows.
Algorithm 1 STB-OM
1) Initialization: Set w˜m, t˜1 and t˜2 as the values which are
feasible to the problem (15).
2) Repeat:
Solve the SOCP problem (15) with (w˜m, t˜1, t˜2) and
obtain the optimal values (w∗m, t∗1, t∗2).
Update (w˜m, t˜1, t˜2) = (w∗m, t∗1, t∗2).
3) Until the convergence threshold is satisfied or the max-
imize number of iterations is reached.
4) Output wm.
The original optimization problem of STB-OM is non-
convex and NP-hard, thus its global optimum cannot be
obtained with polynomial computational complexity using any
known algorithm. By contrast, the proposed scheme, which
is described by Algorithm 1, employs the first order Taylor
approximations to transform the original optimization problem
into a convex optimization problem. The globally optimal
solution of the resultant convex optimization problem can be
obtained upon using Algorithm 1, which, according to [41],
can be proved to converge to a local optimum of the original
optimization problem in a few steps4.
Remark 1. Since the optimization problem defined in (15)
is convex, the optimal solutions {w∗m}Mm=1, t∗0, t∗1, t∗2, are
obtained by solving (15) for a given (w˜m, t˜1, t˜2). At each
iteration, (w˜m, t˜1, t˜2) is updated based on the optimal solu-
tion (w∗m, t∗1, t∗2) obtained in the previous iteration. Hence,
(w˜m, t˜1, t˜2) is always a feasible solution of the current iter-
ation, and the value of t0 obtained for the given (w˜m, t˜1, t˜2)
will be larger than or equal to the value of t0 of the previous
iteration. This observation reveals that the required secrecy rate
will be monotonically increasing (or at least nondecreasing) at
each iteration, which is demonstrated by the numerical results
in Fig. 4. Due to the power constraint, there is an upper bound
for the achievable secrecy rate. Therefore, the convergence of
the proposed Algorithm 1 can be guaranteed.
Remark 2. It is clear that for the STB-OM, only the local CSI
is required at the MBS, including the CSI of MUs and the
CSI of the eavesdropper.
Remark 3. If an FU in a femtocell is wiretapped by another
FU in the same femtocell, the problem is mathematically
identical to that we have solved in this subsection. In other
words, the proposed approach is applicable to general single-
cell interference-free scenarios.
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{wm}Mm=1,t0,t1,t2
t0 (15a)
s.t.
∥∥∥[2wH2 h1, . . . , 2wHMh1, g1 − 1]T
∥∥∥ ≤ g1 + 1, (15b)∥∥∥[2wH1 hE , . . . , 2wHMhE , g2 − 1]T
∥∥∥ ≤ g2 + 1, (15c)∥∥∥[2wH1 hm, . . . , 2wHm−1hm, 2wHm+1hm, .., 2wHMhm, 2, g3m − 1]T
∥∥∥ ≤ g3m + 1, (15d)
Im(wHmhm) = 0,m ∈ [2,M ] , (15e)∥∥∥[wT1 , . . . ,wTM ]T
∥∥∥ ≤√PM , (15f)
‖[2t0, (t1 − t2)]‖ ≤ t1 + t2, (15g)
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Fig. 4. The convergence property of Algorithm 1 under different values of
the transmit power of the MBS.
B. Secrecy Transmit Beamforming Sequentially Performed in
Macrocell and Femtocell (STB-SMF)
Compared to the conventional transmit beamforming with-
out the consideration of secrecy, the secrecy rate performance
of MU1 can be improved by the STB-OM for its clear
objective. In fact, we may further improve the secrecy rate
performance by designing more sophisticated approaches. As
shown in [44], it is potentially feasible to exploit interference
for improving the secrecy rate performance. In order to achieve
this goal, judicious interference management schemes could
be developed. To justify these assumptions, a secrecy-oriented
spectrum allocation strategy, i.e., the proposed SONOSA, is in-
voked to introduce deliberate CCI that is friendly with respect
to the secrecy rate performance of MU1. The SONOSA strat-
egy dynamically changes the local pattern of the underlay OSA
to improve the performance of STB-OM. Based on SONOSA,
the cooperative co-channel FBSs can act independently as
the sources of friendly CCI to degrade the performance of
the eavesdropper. Specifically, the cooperative FBSs selflessly
4The performance gap between Algorithm 1 and the optimal scheme cannot
be provided at this stage due to the difficulty of obtaining the global optimum
of the original optimization problem. Nevertheless, when proper initial values
are given (although this is challenging as well), the local optimum achieved
by Algorithm 1 may be equal to the global optimum of the original problem.
MBS
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FBS
FBS
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IFT
Fig. 5. An example channel model for STB-SMF scheme, consisting of
one MBS, M = 2 MUs, N = 2 cooperative FBSs, and K = 1 FU at
each femtocell. An eavesdropper wiretaps the first MU in the macrocell. As
the SONOSA is adopted, the channel model is equivalent to an interference
channel model. The black solid lines indicate useful data streams, and the
black dash lines indicate interference streams, which are optimized by STB-
SMF. In particular, the blue dotted lines indicate the feedback of interference
temperatures from FBSs to the MBS.
maximize the power of leakage interference imposed on the
eavesdropper to improve the secrecy rate performance of
MU1. By exploiting the null space beamforming technique
at the cooperative FBSs, the interference would only affect
the eavesdropper’s received signal.
Here, as shown in Fig. 4, we develop a novel STB-SMF
scheme to exploit the interference in HetNet with SONOSA.
In what follows, we first discuss the STB design for the n-
th cooperative FBS FBSn, n ∈ [1, N ]. We consider that
FBSn transmits data streams in the null space of Gn =[
h
T
n,1,h
T
n,2, ...,h
T
n,M
]T ∈ CM×NF , which is the collective
channels from FBSn to all legitimate MUs. To guarantee the
existence of the null space, NM > NF > M has to be
satisfied. As a consequence, the interference from FBSn would
only degrade the eavesdropper’s channel. In order to improve
the secrecy rate, we aim at maximizing the interference from
FBSn to the eavesdropper subject to the transmit power
constraint. The problem can be then formulated as follows
8max
Wn
Tr
[
W
H
n Hn,EWn
] (19a)
s.t. Tr
[
W
H
n Wn
] ≤ PF , (19b)
GnWn = 0, (19c)
where Hn,E = hHn,Ehn,E , Wn = [wn,1,wn,2, . . . ,wn,K ],
and GnWn = 0 ensures that FBSn does not generate
interference to the legitimate MUs. In order to eliminate
the inter-cell inter-user interference of the K FUs served
by FBSn, the beamforming vectors of FBSn should also
satisfy wHn,khn,nt = 0, k, t ∈ [1,K], k 6= t. Let us define
wn,k = Vnxn,k, where the columns of Vn constitute an
orthogonal basis for the null space of Gn. The optimization
problem (19) is then equivalent to
max
{xn,k}Kk=1
K∑
k=1
x
H
n,kR1nxn,k (20a)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
x
H
n,kR2nxn,k ≤ PF , (20b)
x
H
n,kV
H
n hn,nt = 0, k, t ∈ [1,K], k 6= t, (20c)
where we have R1n = VHn Hn,EVn, and R2n = VHn Vn.
The above problem can be further transformed into a SOCP
problem by introducing a slack variable α as follows
max
{xn,k}Kk=1,α
α (21a)
s.t.
∥∥∥[hn,EVnxn,1, . . . ,hn,EVnxn,K ]T∥∥∥ ≤ α,
(21b)∥∥∥[Vnxn,1, . . . ,Vnxn,K ]T∥∥∥ ≤√PF , (21c)
x
H
n,kV
H
n hn,nt = 0, k 6= t , k, t ∈ [1,K].
(21d)
As we can see, the problem (21) is a standard SOCP problem
and can be solved efficiently via some numerical solvers, such
as CVX [43]. For some special case, we can even obtain the
closed-form solution. For example, when the number of FU
served by FBSn is 1, i.e., K = 1, the problem (20) can be
simplified as
max
xn,1
x
H
n,1R1nxn,1 (22)
s.t. xHn,1R2nxn,1 ≤ PF .
The optimal solution of (22) is given by x∗n,1 =
αφmax(R1n,R2n), where φmax(R1n,R2n) denotes the gen-
eralized eigenvector corresponding to the largest general-
ized eigenvalue of the matrix pair (R1n,R2n) and α =√
PF
(∥∥∥R 122nφmax (R1n,R2n)
∥∥∥)−1 . The optimal value of
the objective function (22) is PFλmax(R1n,R2n), where
λmax(R1n,R2n) is the largest generalized eigenvalue of ma-
trix pair (R1n,R2n). As a result, the optimal beamforming
vector can be expressed as w∗n,1 = Vnx∗n,1.
After designing the STB at the cooperative FBSs, we
continue to design the STB at the MBS. It is noted that based
on the interference temperature generated by the cooperative
FBSs (cf. (5)), we can obtain the STB of the MBS by
employing the STB-OM with minor modification. Specifically,
let us define the interference temperature generated by FBSn
at the eavesdropper as
IFTn =
K∑
k=1
∣∣hHn,Ew∗n,k∣∣2 , (23)
then the sum of such interference from all N cooperative FBSs
is IFTsum =
∑N
n=1 IFTn. It should be noted that IFTsum
is calculated by the MBS, after receiving the feedback about
IFTn from FBSn. Then the MBS performs STB according to
STB-OM and IFTsum. For clarity, the proposed STB-SMF is
summarized by Algorithm 2 as follows.
Algorithm 2 STB-SMF
1) Obtain the beamforming vector w∗n,k of FBSn with (21)
or (22).
2) Each cooperative FBSn calculates IFTn (23) and trans-
mit it to the MBS.
3) The MBS calculates IFTsum =
∑N
n=1 IFTn and ob-
tains the beamforming vector of the MBS according to
the STB-OM in Algorithm 1.
Remark 4. It is worth mentioning that each cooperative FBS
only needs to send a scalar IFTsum to the MBS in this scheme.
Hence, STB-SMF only incurs a small increase of the backhaul
traffic loads. Furthermore, only the local CSI is required at
each FBS. In contrast, the local CSI and the interference
temperature are required at the MBS.
Remark 5. In the STB-SMF, we take the QoS constraints of
MUs into consideration while the QoS of FUs is ignored.
In other words, we do not intend to ensure or enhance the
QoS of FUs. Transmit beamforming vectors are designed
for the cooperative FBSs to improve the secrecy rate of
the eavesdropped MU, and no interference is generated to
the other MUs. The STB-SMF is an altruistic manner from
the view point of the FBSs. A more practical scheme is
developed in the next subsection, where the QoS of FUs is
considered. Despite this fact, the STB-SMF proposed in this
subsection serves as a preliminary scheme which provides
us the first insight into the interference-aided physical layer
security enhancement in HetNet. Furthermore, the STB-SMF
scheme also acts as a design alternative for achieving the
tradeoff between the performance and the implementation
complexity. Compared to the practical scheme proposed in the
next subsection, less cooperation and computation are required
by the STB-SMF.
C. Secrecy Transmit Beamforming Jointly Performed in
Macrocell and Femtocell (STB-JMF)
In the STB-SMF scheme, CCI is deliberately introduced
and exploited. The secrecy rate performance of MU1 is thus
enhanced, and the QoS of the other MUs is also guaranteed.
Nevertheless, the QoS of the co-channel FUs is ignored, which
implies that we cannot ensure the sum-rate performance of the
FUs of the cooperative FBSs.
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Fig. 6. An example channel model for STB-JMF scheme, consisting of
one MBS, M = 2 MUs, N = 2 FBSs, and K = 1 FU at each femtocell.
An eavesdropper wiretaps the first MU in the macrocell. As the SONOSA
strategy is used, the channel model is equivalent to an interference channel
model. The solid lines indicate useful data streams, and the dash lines indicate
the interference streams. The blue glow dotted lines indicate the CSI streams
delivered from FBSs to the MBS. The red dash-dot lines denote the STB
vectors delivered from the MBS to the FBSs.
In this section, we propose a joint secrecy transmit beam-
forming scheme named STB-JMF to improve the secrecy rate
of MU1 while ensuring the QoS of the other MUs and FUs.
Note that the SONOSA is also used in the STB-JMF scheme
in order to take advantage of the CCI from the point of secrecy.
Our goal is to maximize the secrecy rate of MU1 subject
to the MBS/FBSs transmit power constraints and the SINR
requirements at the other MUs and FUs. The transmit beam-
forming vectors of both the MBS and the cooperative FBSs
are optimized jointly. To be more specific, each cooperative
FBS obtains its local CSI and then sends it to the MBS. As
a result, global CSI becomes available at the MBS. Then, the
MBS jointly optimizes the beamforming vectors with the aid
of the global CSI.
Following the analysis in the previous sections, we can
formulate the original optimization problem as
max
{wm}
M
m=1,
{{wnk}
K
k=1}
N
n=1
log2(1 + SINR1)− log2(1 + SINRE)
(24a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 ≤ PM ,
K∑
k=1
‖wnk‖2 ≤ PF , n ∈ [1, N ] , (24b)
SINRm ≥ γm,m ∈ [2,M ] , (24c)
SINRnk ≥ γnk, n ∈ [1, N ] , k ∈ [1,K] ,
(24d)
where (24b) characterizes the total transmit power constraints
at the MBS and the cooperative FBSs, (24c) is the QoS
requirement of intact user m in the macrocell, and (24d) is the
QoS requirement of FUnk. As we can see, the optimization
problem is non-convex and hence is very hard to solve. Despite
the challenge, in what follows we will show that the problem
can be solved globally optimally by reformulating it as a two-
part problem. Let Wm = wmwHm, Wnk = wnkwHnk, we
can use semidefinite relaxation technique [45] to simplify the
problem. First, we introduce a slack variable τ = SINRE , and
(24) can be equivalently transformed into
max
{wm}
M
m=1,
{{wnk}
K
k=1}
N
n=1
1
1 + τ
[
1 +
Tr(H1W1)
A
′
1
]
(25a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Tr(Wm) ≤ PM , (25b)
K∑
k=1
Tr(Wnk) ≤ PF , n ∈ [1, N ] , (25c)
Tr(HmWm)
A′m
≥ γm,m ∈ [2,M ] , (25d)
Tr(Hn,nkWnk)
C
′
nk
≥ γnk,
n ∈ [1, N ] , k ∈ [1,K] , (25e)
Tr(HEW1)
B′
≤ τ, (25f)
where A′1, A
′
m, B
′
and C ′nk are respectively defined as
A
′
1 =
M∑
m≥2
Tr(HmWm) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,1Wnk) + 1, (26)
A
′
m =
M∑
q=1,q 6=m
Tr(HmWq) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,mWnk) + 1,
(27)
B
′
=
M∑
m≥2
Tr(HEWm) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,EWnk) + 1, (28)
C
′
nk =
K∑
t=1,t6=k
Tr(Hn,nkWnt) +
N∑
p=1,p6=n
K∑
t=1
Tr(Hp,nkWpt)
+
M∑
m=1
Tr(HnkWm) + 1, (29)
Hn,m = hn,mh
H
n,m, Hn,E = hn,Eh
H
n,E , Hn,nk =
hn,nkh
H
n,nk, Hp,nk = hp,nkh
H
p,nk and Hnk = hnkhHnk.
To solve the problem (25), we divided it into two parts.
The outer part is a one-dimensional line search problem with
τ , i.e.,
max
τ
1 +G(τ)
1 + τ
(30)
s.t. 0 ≤ τ ≤ Tr(H1)PM .
The function G(τ) is defined by another optimization problem
to be described later. The lower bound about τ can be obtained
directly from (25f), while the upper bound is derived from the
fact that the secrecy rate is greater than or equal to zero, hence
τ ≤ Tr(H1)PM . For a fixed τ , the inner part can be expressed
as
max
{Wm}Mm=1,{{Wnk}
K
k=1
}Nn=1
Tr(H1W1)
A
′
1
(31)
s.t. (25b)− (25f),
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Algorithm 3 STB-JMF
1) Initialization: Set PM , PF , γm, γnk, ε (the search
precision of the Golden Section Search);
2) Compute τmax = Tr(H1)PM ;
3) Solve (30) by applying one-dimensional line search
method, e.g., the Golden Section Search, on interval
[1, τmax], obtaining the optimal τ∗. To do this, we have
to solve (32) to obtain G∗(τ) for a fixed τ .
4) Obtain (X∗m,X∗nk, ζ∗) for τ∗.
5) Let W∗m = X
∗
m
ζ∗
, W
∗
nk =
X
∗
nk
ζ∗
.
6) If rank(W∗m) = rank(W∗nk) = 1, we can obtain w∗m
and w∗nk via eigenvalue decomposition;
7) Otherwise we apply Gaussian randomization method to
W
∗
m and W∗nk for finding approximate w∗m and w∗nk.
8) End
and G(τ) is equal to the optimal value of (31).
It is observed that the problem (30) is equivalent to the
original problem (25). For any fixed τ , we can obtain G(τ) by
solving (31). Then, applying the one-dimensional line search
method, e.g. Golden Section Search, to the interval [1, 1 +
Tr(H1)PM ], we can solve the problem (25). Hence, the key
step is to solve (31) for a fixed τ . In what follows, we will
concentrate on it.
Since, the objective function of (31) is a linear fractional
function and thus it is quasi-convex [46], then we can use
Charnes-Cooper transformation [47] to convert it into a linear
one. Upon introducing the auxiliary variables Xm,Xnk  0,
ζ > 0, we can rewrite Wm and Wnk as Wm = Xmζ ,
Wnk =
Xnk
ζ
, then the problem (31) can be transformed
into the problem (32).
It can be seen that the problem (32) is an SDP problem [45],
which can be solved efficiently by using numerical solvers
such as CVX [43]. The optimal solution of the problem (32) is
denoted by (X∗m,X∗nk, ζ∗). Hence the corresponding optimal
solution of the problem (31) can be obtained as W∗m = X
∗
m
ζ∗
,
W
∗
nk =
X
∗
nk
ζ∗
. Then, we can solve the problem (30) through the
one-dimensional line search method such as Golden Section
Search. Note that to get the finial solution, we need to solve
a sequence of SDPs.
Let us denote the optimal solution of the problem (30) as
(W˜m,W˜nk). Then, we can obtain the beamforming vector
solution as follows: if rank(W˜m) = 1, the optimal beam-
forming vector w˜m is exactly obtained via eigenvalue decom-
position; otherwise some rank-one approximation procedures,
e.g. Gaussian randomization [48] can be applied to W˜m for
obtaining w˜m. The same procedure is applicable to W˜nk. For
the sake of clarity, the proposed STB-JMF is summarized in
Algorithm 3.
Proposition 1. The optimal solution {Xm}Mm=1,
{{Xnk}Kk=1}Nn=1 of Problem (32) is always rank-one.
Proof: Please see Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that using semidefinite relaxation is
always tight and yields a rank-one solution for the STB-JMF.
Remark 6. In the STB-JMF, not only the QoS of MUs but
also the QoS of FUs are taken into consideration. In other
words, we can guarantee the QoS of all the legitimate users
in both the macrocell and the cooperative femtocells. This
is pragmatically attractive because QoS is one of the most
important performance metrics for practical HetNet.
Remark 7. The STB-JMF scheme is capable of satisfying
the QoS requirements as well as enhancing the secrecy rate
performance of the eavesdropped MU, which is in contrast
to the sole beamforming in STB-OM and the sequential
beamforming in STB-SMF. The cooperative FBSs need to
share their local CSI with the MBS. The CSI of all the
MUs and FUs are available at the MBS, so that the transmit
beamforming vectors for the MBS and FBSs are all designed
at the MBS. Then, the MBS delivers the related beamforming
matrices to the cooperative FBSs.
Remark 8. The proposed three STB schemes exploit the coop-
eration among network nodes in varying degrees. In the STB-
OM scheme, no cooperation is used. In STB-SMF, each coop-
erative FBS designs transmit beamforming vectors separately
for the sake of enhancing the secrecy rate performance of the
eavesdropped MU. A scalar needs to be fed back to the MBS
from each cooperative FBS to assist the secrecy beamforming
at the MBS. In STB-JMF, all the cooperative FBSs have to
share the CSI with the MBS, and the transmit beamforming
vectors for the MBS and FBSs are jointly designed at the
MBS to satisfy universal QoS requirements, which cannot be
supported by the STB-OM and STB-SMF schemes. Moreover,
it is worth pointing out that no data sharing is required for any
of the proposed STB schemes, which ensures low traffic load
on the backhaul links.
Remark 9. Based on [49], we derive the computational com-
plexity of the proposed algorithms as follows. Firstly, the
computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is TI ·O(NMM3.5+
N3MM
2.5) · log2(1ǫ ). Since Algorithm 2 is based on Algorithm
1 and the only difference is that Algorithm 2 has to first
calculate the interference caused by each FBS, the computa-
tional complexity of Algorithm 2 is then characterized by
(
N ·
O(N3FK+NFK2)+TI ·O(NMM3.5+N3MM2.5)
) · log2(1ǫ ).
Finally, Algorithm 3 is based on SDP and one-dimensional line
search, and its computational complexity is TS ·O
(
NK(N3.5M +
N3.5F )+N
2K2(N2.5M +N
2.5
F )+N
3K3(N0.5M +N
0.5
F )
)·log2(1ǫ ),
where ǫ denotes the accuracy requirement, TI is the number
of iterations required in Algorithm 1 and 2, and TS is the
number of searches carried out in Algorithm 3. As we can
see, the computational complexity of Algorithm 3 is higher
than that of Algorithm 1 and 2.
Remark 10. It is easy to extend the proposed schemes to
the scenario where there are multiple eavesdroppers. The
only difference is that the resultant optimization problem has
to consider the SINR constraints of multiple eavesdroppers.
Then, we can use the proposed algorithms to solve them.
For the scenario where multiple legitimate MUs are targeted
by the eavesdroppers, we may maximize either the secrecy
sum-rate of the network or the minimum secrecy rate of the
legitimate MUs, and the process of solving them is similar to
the proposed algorithms.
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max
{Xm}
M
m=1,ζ
{{Xnk}
K
k=1}
N
n=1
Tr(H1X1) (32a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Tr(Xm) ≤ PMζ, (32b)
K∑
k=1
Tr(Xnk) ≤ PF ζ, (32c)
Tr(HmXm) ≥ γm
( M∑
q=1,
q 6=m
Tr(HmXq) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,mXnk) + ζ
)
, (32d)
Tr(Hn,nkXnk) ≥ γnk
( K∑
t=1,
t6=k
Tr(Hn,nkXnt) +
N∑
p=1
p6=n
K∑
t=1
Tr(Hp,nkXpt) +
M∑
m=1
Tr(HnkXm) + ζ
)
, (32e)
Tr(HEX1) ≤ τ
( M∑
m=2
Tr(HEXm) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,EXnk) + ζ
)
, (32f)
M∑
m=2
Tr(HmXm) +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,mXnk) + ζ = 1, (32g)
Xm,Xnk  0, ζ > 0. (32h)
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, simulation results are provided to evaluate
the secrecy rate of MU1 for different transmit beamforming
schemes conceived. We consider a downlink HetNet with a
central MBS serving a circular region C and the area of C is
denoted as C. We suppose the radius of C is 500m. The FBSs
are spatially distributed according to a Poisson point process
ϕf with intensity λf [50]. Therefore, the average number of
FBSs within the cellular coverage is given by NFBS = λfC.
Femtocells are derived from the Voronoi tessellation and we
can attain the stochastic geometry model [36] for the cellular
systems illustrated in Fig. 2. The simplified system models
of the three proposed STB schemes have been illustrated by
Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respectively. In all simulations, the
antenna configurations of the MBS and the FBS are NM = 10
and NF = 4, respectively. The number of MUs is M = 2, and
the number of FUs in each FBS is K = 1. We also assume all
MUs, FUs and the eavesdropper are single-antenna nodes due
to practical constraint. For STB-SMF and STB-JMF schemes,
we assume there are two cooperative FBSs helping improve
the secrecy rate5, and each cooperative FBS serves one FU.
According to the ITU-R channel simulation specifications [51],
we assume that the MBS has larger transmit power than
the FBSs and the specific numerical values are given in the
following. Moreover, the channel is modeled as a Rayleigh
fading channel in all the simulations.
5Our numerical results, which are not provided here due to page limitations,
show that two cooperative FBSs are enough for achieving good secrecy
performance. This is because when the number of cooperative FBSs increases,
the interference imposed on the wiretapped MU also increases, hence the
secrecy performance may not see any notable improvement.
A. Benchmark Scheme
The benchmark scheme is designed as follows. First, we
aim to maximize the rate of the wiretapped MU, i.e., MU1,
without the consideration of secrecy, and obtain the non-
secrecy-oriented beamforming vectors for the legitimate MUs
and the FUs within the cooperative femtocells. Then, we derive
the secrecy rate of MU1 with the non-secrecy-oriented beam-
forming vectors, which serves as our benchmark scheme. To
be more specific, this optimization problem can be expressed
as
max
{wm}
M
m=1,
{{wnk}
K
k=1}
N
n=1
log2(1 + SINR1) (33a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖ ≤ PM ,
K∑
k=1
‖wnk‖ ≤ PF , n ∈ [1, N ], (33b)
SINRm ≥ γm,m ∈ [2,M ] , (33c)
SINRnk ≥ γnk, n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K], (33d)
where (33b) characterizes the transmit power constraint at the
MBS and FBSs, while (33c) and (33d) represent the QoS
requirements of the legitimate MUs and the FUs, respectively.
Note that this nonconvex problem can be transformed into
an SDP problem, which is convex, by dropping a rank-one
constraint that emerges in the transformation process and has
the form of rank(X) = 1. For more details, please refer
to the process of transforming the problem (31) into the
problem (32). Upon finishing the optimization, we can obtain
the secrecy rate of MU1. This scheme has been considered by
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Fig. 7. The secrecy rate of MU1 versus the transmit power of the MBS.
In the STB-SMF and STB-JMF schemes, two FBSs are used to generate
interference.
[15], [28].
B. Performance of the Proposed Schemes
Fig. 7 shows the comparison results regarding MU1’s se-
crecy rate performances with different schemes for PF =
40dB. Because the wiretapped MU1 receives more power but
the received noise power does not rise when the transmit power
of the MBS increases, so we can observe that the secrecy
rate performance of all the four schemes grow as the transmit
power of MBS increases. It is also shown that the secrecy rates
of the proposed three STB schemes always increase faster than
the benchmark scheme, especially when the transmit power
of the MBS is high (e.g., 42dBm and 45dBm). Obviously,
the secrecy rate performance of STB-JMF and STB-SMF is
better than that of STB-OM. This observation verifies that the
deliberately introduced interference is capable of enhancing
enhance the secrecy rate performance of the eavesdropped
MU. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Rs of STB-SMF
slightly outperforms STB-JMF at all the transmit power values
of the MBS, since STB-SMF does not consider the QoS of
FUs.
Fig. 8 illustrates the secrecy rate of MU1 for the STB-SMF
and STB-JMF schemes under various FBS transmit power
values. It is shown that in all schemes the secrecy rate of
MU1 improves as we increase the transmit power of FBS.
Note that the benchmark scheme could finally catch up our
schemes at the cost of very high FBS power. However, even
with little transmit power at each FBS, the proposed schemes
can achieve very high secrecy rate, which is in sharp contract
to the benchmark scheme. This indicates that STB-SMF and
STB-JMF are able to achieve a better Rs without the need to
increase the transmit power of each cooperative FBS. In order
to better illustrate the behaviors of STB-SMF and STB-JMF,
we plot the secrecy rate of MU1 versus the transmit power
of the MBS and one cooperative FBS in a three-dimensional
figure in Fig. 9, where we can observe the variation tendency
of secrecy rate more clearly.
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MBS and each FBS.
Fig. 10 shows that the averaged SINR of FUs versus the
transmit power of the MBS when there is an eavesdropper
wiretapping MU1. Due to symmetry, we only need to evaluate
the averaged SINR of the FU in one cooperative femtocell,
and we assume the SINR requirement of FUs in STB-JMF
scheme is 0.60. From Fig. 10, it is observed that the SINR
of FUs in STB-JMF achieves its optimum and is significantly
superior to that in STB-SMF. We can also conclude that the
SINR constraints (24d) in STB-JMF hold with equality. But
for the STB-SMF scheme, as the transmit power of the MBS
increases, the SINR of FUs goes down dramatically because
more interference is introduced at FUs.
Fig. 11 shows the averaged SINR of each FU versus the
transmit power of each FBS when there is an eavesdropper
wiretapping MU1. Similarly, the SINR requirement of FUs in
STB-JMF is set as 0.60. We can also see that STB-JMF has
advantages related to the averaged SINR of FU. It is worth
noting that when the transmit power of each FBS is relatively
low, e.g., around 20 dBm, the SINR constraint in STB-JMF
could not be satisfied and thus there is no optimal solution.
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Hence, we slightly decrease the SINR requirement of FUs to
0.5 to ensure that the optimization problem can be solved. So
in Fig. 11, at the point of 20dBm, we can see the averaged
SINR decreases slightly. However, from Fig. 10 and 11, we
can clearly see that the benefit of STB-JMF is to maximize
secrecy rate of the wiretapped MU while maintaining QoS for
all related FUs and the intended MU.
C. Impact of Artificial Noise (AN) on the Proposed Schemes
AN plays an important role in the physical layer security
and may achieve substantial secrecy performance in some
scenarios. In what follows we provide some simulations to
verify whether AN is still beneficial for our schemes. To this
end, AN is introduced into the STB-OM, the STB-SMF and
the STB-JMF in these simulations. Furthermore, except for
the beamforming schemes proposed in this paper, we also
present two additional schemes for the purpose of comparison
in these simulations, which are the “joint beamforming and
AN design”, as well as the “beamforming design with random
AN”.
Let us consider the broadcast channel as an example, then
Fig. 12. Two-user interference channel with an eavesdropper.
the optimization problem of “joint beamforming and AN
design” can be expressed as
max
{wm}Mm=1,z
log(1 + SINR1)− log(1 + SINRE) (34a)
s.t. SINRm ≥ γm,m ∈ [2,M ] , (34b)
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖2 + ‖z‖ ≤ PM , (34c)
where SINRm and SINRE are the received SINRs at MUm
and at the eavesdropper E, respectively. These SINRs are
given by
SINRm =
|hmwm|2
σ2M +
∑M
q=1,q 6=m |hmwq|2 + |hmz|2
, (35)
SINRE =
|hEw1|2
σ2E +
∑M
m=2 |hEwm|2 + |hEz|2
, (36)
where z is the AN vector. Hence, we can solve this optimiza-
tion problem using Algorithm 1 proposed in this paper. Note
that this model mimics the effect of AN in the STB-OM.
On the other hand, considering the “beamforming design
with random AN” for the broadcast channel, we transmit
random AN and the optimized beamforming vectors at the
MBS. The optimization problem is similar to (34) except that
the optimization variables are only {wm}Mm=1, which do not
include z.
Note that the STB-SMF and the STB-JMF rely on an
interference channel. For simplicity, we only consider the
typical scenario where there are two transmitters each having
four antennas, two receivers each having a single antenna and
one single-antenna eavesdropper trying to wiretap one of the
transmitters, as shown in Fig. 12.
We present the simulation results for the broadcast channel
(as shown in Fig. 13) and for the interference channel (as
shown in Fig. 14). From Fig. 13 and Fig. 14, we can see
that the secrecy rate of the system is almost the same for the
proposed schemes whether there exists AN (joint design) or
not. Therefore, we can conclude that transmitting AN using the
additional NM −M dimensions does not have any significant
impact on the performance of the proposed schemes. This is
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because in the proposed STB-OM scheme, we assume that
there are multiple MUs, thus the MBS has to transmit multiple
data flows. Therefore, the STB-OM relies on a broadcast
channel. At the eavesdropper, the data from other legitimate
MUs can be regarded as interference. For the STB-SMF and
the STB-JMF, the data from FBSs can also be treated as
interference. These interferences are essentially equivalent to
the special ANs imposed on the eavesdropper.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the physical-layer secu-
rity schemes in a two-tier downlink HetNet. On the basis of the
two suggested spectrum allocation strategies, the OSA and the
SONOSA, three STB schemes, i.e., STB-OM, STB-SMF and
STB-JMF, have been proposed to maximize the secrecy rate
of the eavesdropped user. According to various considerations
of the QoS requirements of the legitimate users, the three
proposed secrecy schemes adopt different degrees of collab-
oration among MBS and its cooperative FBSs. In particular,
the complicated nonconvex STB optimization problems have
been solved by problem reformulations with SDP and SOCP
techniques. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the
proposed schemes. For the future work, it would be interesting
to consider the scenario where multiple eavesdroppers and/or
targeted MUs exist in the HetNet. Additionally, the robust STB
schemes in the context of imperfect CSI may be investigated.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The maximization problem (32) can be equivalently trans-
formed into
min
{Xm}
M
m=1,ζ
{{Xnk}
K
k=1}
N
n=1
Tr(HEX1) (37a)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
Tr(Xm) ≤ PMζ, (37b)
K∑
k=1
Tr(Xnk) ≤ PF ζ, n ∈ [1, N ], (37c)
Tr(HmXm) ≥ γm
( M∑
q=1,
q 6=m
Tr(HmXq)
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,mXnk) + ζ
)
,m ∈ [2,M ],
(37d)
Tr(Hn,nkXnk) ≥ γnk
( K∑
t=1,
t6=k
Tr(Hn,nkXnt)
+
N∑
p=1
p6=n
K∑
t=1
Tr(Hp,nkXpt)
+
M∑
m=1
Tr(HnkXm) + ζ
)
,
n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K], (37e)
Tr(H1X1) ≥ τ
( M∑
m=2
Tr(HmXm)
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,1Xnk) + ζ
)
, (37f)
M∑
m=2
Tr(HEXm)
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
Tr(Hn,EXnk) + ζ = 1, (37g)
Xm,Xnk  0, ζ > 0. (37h)
It is easy to verify that Problem (37) satisfies the Slater’s
condition. Then, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
are the sufficient and necessary optimality conditions. Some
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KKT conditions needed in the proof are expressed as follows:
G
∗
1 = a
∗
I+HE +
M∑
m=2
b∗mγmHm
+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
c∗nkγnkHnk − d∗H1, (38a)
G
∗
1X1 = 0, (38b)
G
∗
m = a
∗
I+
M∑
q 6=1,m
b∗qγqHq +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
c∗nkγnkHnk
+ d∗τHm + e
∗
HE − b∗mHm,m 6= 1, (38c)
G
∗
mXm = 0,m 6= 1, (38d)
G
∗
nk = a
∗
nI+
M∑
m=2
b∗mγmHn,m +
K∑
t6=k
c∗ntγntHn,nt
+
N∑
p6=n
K∑
k=1
c∗pkγpkHn,pk + d
∗τHn,1 − c∗nkHn,nk,
n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K], (38e)
G
∗
nkXnk = 0, n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈ [1,K], (38f)
where G∗m  0, m ∈ [1,M ], G∗nk  0, n ∈ [1, N ], k ∈
[1,K], a∗ ≥ 0, a∗n ≥ 0, bm ≥ 0, cnk ≥ 0, d ≥ 0, e ≥ 0
are the optimal dual variables associated with the constraints
Xm,Xnk  0 and (37b)-(37g), respectively.
Note that (38a), (38c) and (38e) have a similar structure,
hence we only focus on the proof of rank(X∗1) = 1.
rank(X∗m) = 1, m ∈ [2,M ], and rank(X∗nk) = 1, n ∈
[1, N ], k ∈ [1,K], can be proved by using the same method.
If X∗1 = 0, the resultant secrecy rate is zero, which is trivial.
Then, we have X∗1 6= 0. According to (38b), the rank of G∗1
must be less than or equal to n− 1, i.e.,
rank(G∗1) ≤ n− 1. (39)
An important observation is that with the optimal solution,
the power constraints (37b) and (37c) have to be satisfied with
equality [42]. Therefore, we have a∗ > 0 and a∗n > 0, n ∈
[1, N ]. Let
V = a∗I+HE +
M∑
m=2
b∗mγmHm +
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
c∗nkγnkHnk
=
(
V
1
2
)2 ≻ 0, (40)
where V 12 =
(
V
1
2
)H
≻ 0, then the rank of G∗1 can be further
expressed as
rank(G∗1) = rank (V − d∗H1)
= rank
(
V
1
2 (I− d∗H1)V 12
)
a
= rank
(
I− d∗V− 12H1V− 12
)
≥ n− 1, (41)
where the equation a holds true relying on the following fact
rank(B) = rank(AB) = rank(BC) = rank(ABC), (42)
where Am×m and Cn×n are both non-singular matrices, and
Bm×n is an arbitrary matrix.
From (39) and (41), we have rank(G∗1) = n − 1. Ac-
cording to (38b), we have rank(X∗1) ≤ dim(N (G∗1)) =
n− rank(G∗1) = 1. Since X∗1 6= 0, we obtain rank(X∗1) = 1.
Following the same procedure, we are capable of proving
that rank(X∗m) = 1, m ∈ [2,M ], and rank(X∗nk) = 1, n ∈
[1, N ], k ∈ [1,K]. Hence, we have completed the proof.
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